

## REPORT

## CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 15 October 1951

NO. OF PAGES 3

NO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C., 21 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1-HUM

## 50X1-HUM

1. Since [redacted] September 1951, [redacted] in the area southwest of Berlin [redacted] reports indicating that additional troop contingents had arrived in the previously lightly occupied area of Calbe (Saale), Aken, Dessau and Wittenberg in Land Saxony-Anhalt. The reports allege the presence of a new Tk Div (300 Tks) which allegedly has been transferred directly from the USSR via [redacted] rail points Guben, Cottbus and Falkenberg. Similar reports also claim that the 7th Gds Tk Div previously stationed at Rosslau and assigned to the 3rd Gds Macz Army has been transferred to the 3rd Shock Army and will remain in the [redacted] Heath maneuver area indefinitely. The home station barracks of that Div in Vic. Dessau have been renovated.

50X1-HUM

2. [ ] the situation at present considerably more serious than it was a year ago. Our own optimistic estimate that the Russians are neither willing nor capable of commencing aggressive action against Western Germany does not find the endorsement of some well-informed analysts. We base our opinion on the following analysis:

CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

[illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

- a. The Russians are not capable of gaining the areas of the Rhine estuary, the Rhine/Main triangle, and the area around Mannheim and Karlsruhe without great risk to themselves even after transfer of one or more divisions to the Soviet Zone. They would find serious opposition from U.S., U.K. and French Divs in Lower Saxony, Hesse and northern Bavaria. Moreover, the Western Allies have greatly improved their air superiority since the fall of 1950. Russian military tactics for centuries have been based on the concept that the attacker must have an overwhelming force. To achieve this, the transfer of an additional 10 to 15 Divs would be necessary.
- b. We estimate the strength of the Soviet Zone paramilitary units (**BVA Bereitschaften**) as 55,927 as of 1 August 1951.\* These units, however, are neither trained nor equipped for commitment in the first wave of attack.
- c. The armies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania are being modernized as quickly as possible. However, that program will not be completed for at least another twelve months.
- d. Hence, the Russians would have to rely entirely on their own forces for sudden aggressive action. It is doubtful that they have more than 30 Divs in the area of the Soviet Zone of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Rumania.

It is our opinion, therefore, that the transfer of the additional divisions to the Soviet Zone of Germany is a move in the war of nerves, and that it is designed to discourage the inclusion of West German units in the European Army.

3. The foregoing arguments, however, are not intended to depreciate the fact that the Russian Armies in the Soviet Zone are maintaining a very high state of preparedness and are capable of a short term surprise attack which would undoubtedly be successful in the initial phases. In view of the great care that has been exercised during the last few months in the expenditure of POL and ammunition supplies, it must be assumed that the Russian units in the Soviet Zone have sufficient quantities of Class I, III and V supplies for at least two weeks of operation.

4. A special effort is under way to clarify the reports of the arrival of new units. When it has been completed, a new estimate of the situation will be submitted.

C. Activities of Soviet Ground Forces

5. [ ] the period 1 August to 6 September 1951. There were 50X1-HUM no major tactical exercises during the period. Troop movements were discontinued about 1 August. Prior to that time a total of 55,000 recruits had arrived in the Zone and 15,000 veterans were returned to the Zone of the Interior. Up until the end of the period, the recruits were held at the various winter garrisons where they received basic training. The returnees were drawn from the garrison household details, thus the combat value of field forces was not affected by the exchange of personnel. During August, many German 50X1-HUM persons employed by the Russian Army were discharged. According to [ ] reports, an order of General Chuikov requires the dismissal of all German personnel in the employ of the Russian Army during the coming winter or early in the spring of 1952.

TOP SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

TOP SECRET/CONTROL -- U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-3-

6. All during August and early September, general officers and high-ranking general staff officers inspected troops during division field exercises in summer training camps. It was also noted that the majority of vehicles assigned to combat units had been placed on blocks in various wooded areas. Sometimes the wheels of the vehicles thus dead [ ] are painted white. Only 50X1-HUM a limited number of vehicles are used for supply runs. Consequently, field exercises were on a limited scope. Exceptions to this [ ] were 50X1-HUM noted in the Letzling Heath where large-scale maneuvers with troops from all branches of the service were observed, and along the Elbe at Wittenberg-Alten and Bittkau-Polte where large-scale engineering exercises were held by units of the 8th Gds Army and the 3rd Shock Army. The units usually operated in strength of two Pns. The activities were confined to major bridge-building and ferrying exercises. The areas were usually protected by small Inf and armored units. 50X1-HUM

7. Units attached and assigned to the IV Arty Corps emphasized fire control and aerial observation in their firing practice at Altengrabow. [ ] balloons as well as planes were used for observation. At all ranges, small air force detachments were observed operating with the Arty units. Small anti-aircraft units practiced at the Merick Peninsula range. They were generally on the range for only four or five days.

8. The 207th Rifle Div and the 12th Gds Tk Div remained in their respective garrisons at Stendal and Neuruppin where they held small field exercises. Troops of the 9th Tk Div in Neustrelitz remained in the training area at Murnitz-See. The 33rd Gds Inf Rgt moved from Pasewalk to Murnitz-See during August.

9. Transports passing through Frankfurt/Oder during the last six weeks consisted 90 percent of non-military items; the other 10 percent was gasoline and ammunition. Light gasoline is exported while special types of gasoline arrived in Frankfurt and Guben from Doryslaw (western Ukraine, formerly Poland). Most of the imported gasoline went to air force units; the army was supplied very sparingly. Arrival of new radio signal equipment was reported repeatedly. This tends to confirm previous reports that the Russian Army in Germany is to receive new radio signal equipment during 1951.

10. In some instances, reports indicated an early departure from troop training areas. However, the 3rd Shock Army and the 8th Gds Army were preparing for major maneuvers involving probably both armies. If the large general maneuvers should not be held this fall, it would indicate a shortage of supplies, especially of gasoline.

11. A general decrease of the present tension will only be indicated when the newly arrived recruits are assigned to combat units, when the veterans are returned to Russia and when the troops return to their winter quarters.

[ ] Comments:

50X1-HUM

\* Strategic Division, OI HICOG estimates the strength at that time as 51,000

50X1-HUM

TOP SECRET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

**Page Denied**